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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether or not the doctrine of res judicata 
is available to bar the appellant's personal 
injury action against the respondent. 
Whether or not the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel precludes the litigation of whether 
the shooting was intentional or unintentional 
in the event this Court rules against res 
judicata as a bar to appellant's personal 
injury action. 
Whether or not the doctrine of interspousal 
immunity bars unintentional tort actions 
between spouses. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELAINE HANSON NOBLE, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
V. GLEN NOBLE, ) 
Defendant/Respondent. 
i Supreme Court No. 20401 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE 
On the night of August 18, 1980, Elaine Hanson Noble, the 
appellant, was shot during a struggle with V. Glen Noble, the 
respondent, over a gun in her possession. Mr. Noble claims the 
shooting was accidental since the gun fired as a result of his 
attempt to wrest it away from Mrs. Noble to prevent her from 
harming herself. (D.R. 638-641).* Mrs. Noble contends the 
shooting was caused either intentionally or negligently by her 
husband, Glen Noble. (P.I.R. 88-94). At the time of the 
shooting, the couple was living together and had been married 
approximately three years. (D.R. 608). 
A criminal action was brought against Glen Noble for 
attempted murder and he was acquitted on all charges. (D.R. 
650) . 
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 As with the appellant's brief, references to the record 
in the respondent's brief will identify the personal injury 
case record as P.I.R. (Appeal No. 2041) and will identify the 
divorce case record as D.R. (Appeal No. 19934). 
On March 13, 1981, Glen Noble commenced an action for 
divorce against Elaine Noble and she counterclaimed for divorce. 
(D.R. 5-11). During the pendency of the divorce action, Elaine 
Noble commenced a separate personal injury action against 
Glen Noble initially alleging that he negligently caused her 
injury and later, after amendment, alleging that he either 
negligently or intentionally caused her injury• (P.I.R. 6-8; 
88-94). He answered by generally denying her allegations and 
he raised the defense that the doctrine of interspousal immunity 
barred the negligence cause of action. (P.I.R. 18-19). 
Thereafter, on April 19, 1983, the trial court granted partial 
summary judgment in favor of Mr. Noble dismissing the negligence 
cause of action ruling it was barred by interspousal immunity. 
The cause of action for intentionally caused injury still 
remained. (P.I.R. 132-133). 
The divorce action came to trial on December 22-23, 1983, 
and January 23, 1984, before Judge Tibbs. (D.R. 107-123). 
During the course of the trial, Mrs. Noble presented a 
substantial amount of evidence directly bearing on the cause of 
her personal injury and damages she incurred as a result of it. 
Testimony was received from four police officers who investigated 
the shooting; a psychologist who described Mrs. Noble's mental 
incapacities since the shooting; a neurologist who described her 
2 
brain damage as a result of the shooting; and other witnesses 
that testified to her injury and resulting damages. Exhibits 
were received that consisted, among others, of a photograph of 
the gun; x-rays of Mrs. Noble's skull and the bloodied bedding 
from where the shooting occurred. (P.I.R. 108-115). 
Judge Tibbs granted Elaine Noble's counterclaim for divorce 
and denied Glen Noble's claim for divorce. His ruling recited 
that Mrs. Noble was intentionally shot by Mr. Noble, that she 
was rendered permanently disabled and that she had a life 
expectancy of 38.5 years. He awarded her alimony in the amount 
of $750 a month and awarded her a property settlement valued at 
$274,161 from Mr. Noble's assets allegedly valued at $800,000. 
(D.R. 138-150) . Mrs. Noble had brought into the three year 
marriage a half interest in a small house, furniture and an 
automobile. (D.R. 657). 
At a hearing that reviewed the divorce action findings of 
fact and conclusions of law held on April 13, 1984, Judge Tibbs 
stated that the divorce action and the tort action were all 
interwoven and he took the personal injury issues into 
consideration when he heard the divorce case and ruled upon the 
distribution of property and award of alimony. (D.R. 300-308). 
Mr. Noble timely filed a Notice of Appeal from that action on May 
3 
1, 1984. The appeal, number 19934, is presently pending before 
this Court. 
Thereafter, on July 12, 1984, Mr. Noble brought a motion to 
dismiss the personal injury action based upon the doctrine of 
res judicata because the divorce action had litigated the 
personal injury issues and made an award that encompassed those 
claimed damages to Mrs. Noble. (P.I.R. 176). The trial court 
granted the motion on December 14, 1984, and Mrs. Noble filed a 
Notice of Appeal. (P.I.R. 197-198). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The doctrine of res judicata bars the appellant from 
maintaining this personal injury action against the respondent. 
Res judicata is applicable when a prior action and a subsequent 
action involve the same partes or their privies, when there has 
been a final judgment on the merits in the prior action and the 
prior action involved the same issue or an issue that could have 
been raised in the prior action. It is the respondents conten-
tion that all the elements of res judicata have been met in this 
instance since the parties are identical, a final judgment was 
entered in the divorce action and the trial court in the divorce 
action fully adjudicated the personal injury claim in that 
proceeding. Statements from the trial court unequivocally 
indicate that he granted the appellant an award for the personal 
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injury claim that was combined into the alimony and property 
settlement determination. Accordingly, res judicata bars the 
appellant from bringing this second action which would result in 
her obtaining a double recovery - a personal injury damage award 
in the prior action and a second "windfall" personal injury 
damage award in the case at hand. The trial court correctly 
dismissed the appellant's action based on the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
Sufficient portions of the divorce action record were 
before the trial court to enable it to render an informed and 
proper ruling on whether this action was barred by res judicata. 
It is not necessary to submit the entire record of the prior 
action to the court. Based on sufficient evidence of the prior 
proceeding, including Judge Tibb's statement that he considered 
the personal injury issues when he made the property settlement 
and alimony determination in the divorce proceeding, the trial 
court correctly determined the appellant's personal injury 
action was barred. 
The fact that the divorce action judgment has been appealed 
does not alter its finality for res judicata purposes. The 
general rule of law, is that a judgment remains final despite the 
taking of an appeal. 
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In the event that this Court rules res judicata is not 
available to bar the appellant's personal injury action, then 
the appellant's contention that collateral estoppel precludes 
litigation of whether the shooting was intentional must fail. 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is 
available only after a four element test has been met. One of 
the elements is that a final judgment be rendered on the merits. 
Another element is that a determination of the issue be essential 
to the judgment. The issue of whether or not the shooting was 
intentional was not essential to the granting of the divorce 
decree since the decree could have been based on two independent 
statutory grounds - habitual drunkenness or cruel treatment. For 
these reasons, the appellant will be unable to meet two elements 
of the test for application of collateral estoppel, hence the 
issue of whether the shooting was intentional or unintentional 
may be litigated again. 
Lastly, the trial court correctly ruled that the appellant's 
unintentional tort claim was barred by the doctrine of 
interspousal immunity. While the Utah Supreme Court has carved 
out an exception to the immunity for intentional tort actions 
between spouses, it has left in place the doctrine as a complete 
bar to unintentional tort actions. The respondent maintains 
that this Court should not completely abrogate the doctrine for 
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both intentional and unintentional torts. There are public 
policy reasons for retaining immunity because it promotes marital 
harmony, prevents collusive lawsuits, avoids trivial and spurious 
lawsuits and prevents rewarding the tortfeasor spouse for 
wrongdoing by indirectly benefiting in an award. Numerous other 
jurisdictions have relied upon these public policy considerations 
to partially abrogate interspousal immunity for intentional torts 
while leaving it as a bar to unintentional tort actions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURTS ALIMONY AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AWARDS 
INCLUDED COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND 
IS RES JUDICATA TO A SECOND ACTION ON ANY 
PART OF THE SAME CLAIM. 
A. The Doctrine of Res Judicata Bars the Appellant's 
Personal Injury Action. 
The rule in all jurisdictions is that a judgment entered in 
a divorce proceeding is conclusive upon the parties as to all 
matters that were litigated in that action when a subsequent 
suit is brought upon the same or substantially the same cause of 
action. In this connection, causes of action are not different 
by virtue merely of their form or the relief sought, but are 
considered the same cause of action where a different judgment in 
the second action would impair the interest established by the 
first. See, 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 174(3); Costantini v. Trans 
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World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 1982) (res judicata 
not avoided merely because new legal theory pleaded). 
In numerous settings courts have applied the doctrine of 
res judicata to bar a second action where it was advanced upon 
the same or substantially the same cause of action that was 
litigated in a prior determination. Indeed, claim preclusion 
bars a second action that had any part of the claim determined in 
the original action and must necessarily be applied regardless of 
any ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular case. 
See, Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 
401 (1981). 
In Hall v. Hall, 455 So.2d 813 (Ala. 1984), a divorced wife 
brought an action against her former husband alleging that he had 
induced her to consent to a divorce by representing that he 
wanted a divorce for business reasons and that they would 
continue to live together; however, in reality he wanted the 
divorce so he could marry another woman. The wife's tort action 
was for fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and bad faith. The court, 
noting that the divorce decree had been determined based upon 
oral testimony, stated: 
An inquiry into the damages she suffered by 
relying on the defendant's representations 
would necessarily require an inquiry into the 
adequacy of the award in the divorce action. 
Since [the plaintiff] has chosen not to 
8 
attack the award in the divorce decree, she 
should be bound by it. 
Id.. at 815. 
In the case at hand, the appellant does not wish to set 
aside the divorce award but is attempting to obtain an additional 
"windfall" award by bringing a separate tort action. The 
appellant's injuries were an integral part of the alimony and 
property settlement award and as such are res judicata to a 
second suit. The divorce court based a considerable portion of 
the alimony and property settlement awards on the injuries of the 
appellant. This fact is evidenced by the great amount of 
personal injury testimony and evidence introduced at trial by the 
appellant, including a substantial amount of testimony from 
medical experts who described her injuries in great detail. 
In Coucrhlin v. Christoffersen. 431 P.2d 997 (Wash. 1967), a 
wife brought an action for defamation and alienation of affection 
against her former husband. The court, after granting the 
husband's motion to dismiss because the action was res judicata 
in the divorce decree, stated: 
[0]ur review of the record shows that all 
causes of action well pleaded in the instant 
complaint against plaintiff's former husband 
were heard and disposed of in the divorce 
decree and that the order of dismissal 
should be and is affirmed. 
Id.. at 998. 
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In the instant action, the appellant effectively tried the 
tort action as part of the divorce proceeding. She presented 
extensive testimony as to the shooting through physical evidence 
and a number of witnesses, including a doctor, four policemen, a 
psychologist, relatives and neighbors. Certainly, the same 
evidence (witnesses and damages) presented in the divorce action 
would be principally relied upon in the subsequent personal 
injury action. Furthermore, the courtfs alimony and property 
settlement award was specifically premised upon the personal 
injury. In the hearing on April 13, 1984, to consider the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court in the 
divorce action specifically stated that the tort case was 
interwoven into the divorce action and that the divorce findings 
encompassed the tort action. (D.R. 300-302; 307-308). The 
trial judge in court room exchange with respondent's counsel, 
stated: 
I do not think there is any way of trying the 
divorce action and not trying the tort case. 
I think it was because it is all interwoven. 
That is why I tried to get to the point, but 
I could not do it (D.R. 300) . . . 
All right, now let's get back and read 
[finding] no. 8 . . . That is the tort case. 
If you want to argue, that is what I found. 
I do not have any doubt about that. (D.R. 
301) . 
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Of course, I cannot there is no way I can 
eliminate the tort action. (D.R. 302)• 
Thus, the trial court was fully aware of the pending tort 
action, had received evidence of the injury and had made alimony 
and property settlement awards based upon the injuries sustained 
in the personal injury as part of the divorce proceeding. The 
court, in responding to the appellant's request for findings, 
noted: 
I am not going to do it like you suggested, 
but I am not adverse to saying something like 
that, that the court has considered all the 
property owned by the parties and the court 
has considered the injuries that Mrs. Noble 
sustained in reaching this decision. . . . 
(D.R. 306). 
There is no question that I considered the 
situation of the parties as of the time of 
the action, both their mental and physical 
health, and there is no question that I tried 
to reach a decision which I thought was a 
fair and proper and equitable distribution of 
all of the property that I had knowledge of. 
(D.R. 307-308). 
Clearly, the trial court in the divorce proceeding included 
the personal injury claim as part of the alimony and property 
settlement awards. By so doing, the trial court extinguished all 
rights of the appellant with respect to all or any part of the 
transaction out of which the cause of action arose. The doctrine 
of res judicata includes facts which are related in time, space, 
origin and motivation. Thus, res judicata applies to extinguish 
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the appellant's claim even though she asserts an alternative 
theory in the second action. See, Costantini v. Trans World 
Airlines. 681 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1982). 
In Krofcheck v. Downey State Bank, 580 P.2d 243 (Utah 1978), 
the Utah Supreme Court set out the elements of res judicata as 
(1) the two cases must be between the same parties or their 
privies; (2) there must have been a final judgment on the merits 
of the prior case; and (3) the prior adjudication must have 
involved the same issue or an issue that could or should have 
been raised. Clearly, all the requirements of res judicata have 
been fulfilled in the case at hand since the parties are the 
same, a final judgment has been rendered, and the trial judge in 
the divorce case adjudicated the personal injury issue. 
The trial judge, Judge Tibbs, unequivocally stated that the 
alimony and property settlement determination encompassed the 
personal injuries. At the April 13, 1984, hearing he stated: 
You [appellant's counsel] didn't think there 
should be anything in my findings saying 
that I considered the injuries and damages? 
Really, haven't I really — I looked at the 
whole thing. Of course, I heard it and I 
made a decision and now for you to say, "you 
didn't do that Judge," seems to me like — 
aren't they [plaintiff] entitled to say, 
Judge, you considered all these things? 
. . . (D.R. 327). 
And, the damage, whether you call it damage 
or whether you call it property settlement, 
whether you call it alimony doesn't make any 
difference really. Thatfs there, and that 
was it. (D.R. 330). 
There can be no doubt that the trial court awarded compensa-
tion for the tort injuries, hence the doctrine of res judicata 
must be applied. 
The Utah Supreme Court has denied two bites of the same 
apple as a matter of law in past decisions. In Wheadon v. 
Pearson. 14 Utah 2d 45, 376 P.2d 946, 948 (1962), the plaintiff 
brought an action to establish a right of way by prescriptive 
easement. The trial court rendered summary judgment in the 
defendants favor. Later, the plaintiff filed a second lawsuit 
asserting an implied easement claim. The trial court dismissed 
the second lawsuit and was upheld on appeal. This Court affirmed 
the application of the bar of res judicata by denying the second 
action. In the decision it was stated: 
Policy would seem to indicate that when a 
plaintiff has once attempted to obtain his 
entire relief, based upon his entire claim, 
then the matter should be laid at rest. He 
should be denied a second attempt at 
substantially the same objective under a 
different guise. 
Id., at 948. 
In the case at hand, the appellant persisted in trying the 
tort claim before the divorce court and received inordinate 
alimony and property settlement awards based upon her personal 
injuries. Thus, having obtained the sought after personal injury 
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damages in the divorce action, the appellant should be denied a 
second attempt at the same objective under guise of a personal 
injury action. 
In Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387 (Utah 1985), this Court 
mandated the principle that tort actions are not to be tried as 
separate claims in divorce actions. In Walther, the divorce 
court made a $5,000 award for the wifefs battery claim. 
Restating the mandate of Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1983), 
this Court stated in Walther: 
We believe that divorce actions will become 
unduly complicated in their trial and 
disposition if torts can be or must be 
litigated in the same action. The admini-
stration of justice will be better served by 
keeping the two proceedings separate. 
Id., at 388. 
The appellant herein is attempting to skirt the mandate of 
Walther by trying the tort claim in divorce court, obtaining 
damages and then subsequently bringing a second action for 
personal injuries. The appellant insisted on presenting evidence 
solely appropriate to the tort action at time of the divorce 
trial. Having once obtained a judgment on the merits, she is 
barred from a second action on the same claim. Thus, as a matter 
of law, the appellant must not be allowed to go forward with this 
second action since she is barred from doing so by the doctrine 
of res judicata. 
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B. The Record of the Divorce Case was Properly Before 
the Trial Court. 
The trial court properly based its res judicata ruling on 
pertinent portions of the record which were before it. The 
appellant's contention that the entire record must be before the 
court to render a res judicata ruling is without merit. 
The latest statement of the proper rule came from the New 
Mexico Supreme Court in 1985, in International Paper Company v. 
Farrar. 102 N.M. 739, 700 P.2d 642 (1985). There, the defendant 
attempted to invoke collateral estoppel to prevent the plaintiff 
from re-litigating a claim for $18,315.00 in damages he received 
in a prior suit. The Court stated the rule is that "sufficient 
evidence" of the prior action must be provided to the trial 
court. 
It is the burden of the movant invoking the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel to introduce 
sufficient evidence for the Court to rule 
whether the doctrine is applicable. 
700 P.2d at 645 (emphasis added). 
In State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Century Home 
Components, Inc., 550 P.2d 1185 (Ore. 1976), the facts were that 
a fire started in a manufacturing plant and spread to adjacent 
buildings. The owners of the adjacent property brought numerous 
actions against the manufacturer who procured some favorable 
judgments and some adverse. Later, thirteen additional claimants 
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brought suit against the manufacturer to recover damages. The 
trial court ruled that the manufacturer was collaterally estopped 
from contesting liability and it appealed. The Oregon Supreme 
Court stated: 
The party asserting estoppel bears the 
responsibility of placing into evidence the 
prior judgment and sufficient portions of the 
record . . . to enable the court to reach 
that conclusion with the requisite degree of 
certainty. 
Id., at 1188. (emphasis added). 
It is clear that in the case at hand, the respondent 
introduced more than sufficient evidence for the trial court to 
make an informed and proper ruling. This Court took judicial 
notice of the files and records of the divorce case and had 
before it substantial portion of the transcript of the testimony 
and arguments. The memorandum supporting the motion to dismiss 
before Judge Ballif contained the following pertinent statements 
from the divorce record wherein Judge Tibbs unequivocally stated: 
What I was trying to do is reach, solve all 
your lawsuits all at once and I will make the 
decision right now. I have got all the 
assets before me and got the parties before 
me and I would settle everything, including 
the other action too. I don't think, that is 
not very hard to decide on, is it? (D.R. 
208) . 
* * * 
I am saying I would make a decision resolving 
all issues between the parties in this 
16 
action. There would be no further lawsuit, 
period, not only the one that is filed 
— that would be gone. They wouldn't be 
able to file the lawsuits against each other 
for anything that happened in the past from 
this day back. It would be all over, 
everything over, and I would just make a 
decision involving the parties period, so 
there would be no lawsuits. The personal 
injury lawsuit would be gone and both parties 
would be prevented from suing each other for 
anything that happened prior to this date. 
(D.R. 208). 
(P.I.R. 169) (Emphasis added). 
These statements, among others, quoted in Mr. Noble's 
memorandum, with cites to the divorce record, gives strong 
indication of Judge Tibb's intentions in the divorce case. Judge 
Ballif properly relied on these statements and others to make his 
ruling to bar the personal injury action based on res judicata. 
After Mr. Noble presented his memorandum to the trial court, the 
burden shifted to the plaintiff to "bring to the trial court's 
attention circumstances indicating the absence of a full and fair 
opportunity to contest the issue in the first action or other 
considerations which would make the application of [res judicata] 
unfair." State Farm, supra, 550 P.2d at 1189. The plaintiff 
could not meet this burden at the trial court level; therefore, 
the ruling should stand. 
Despite the fact that both cases discussed above involved 
collateral estoppel and not res judicata is of no consequence 
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because the reasoning underlying the doctrines is identical. Res 
judicata, like collateral estoppel, is a judicial economy 
argument designed to promote judicial efficiency by precluding 
claims or issues which were litigated previously. 
The appellant cites two cases in support of her position. 
In the first, Searle Brothers v. Searle. 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 
1978), this Court did not hold that "sufficient portions" from a 
trial record are insufficient to examine and use as a basis for 
rendering a res judicata ruling; rather, the Court, citing Parish 
v. Lavton Citv Corp.. 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975), stated that the 
record was "not necessarily examined independently by the trial 
court." Searle Brothers. 588 P.2d at 692. Such language is not 
enough to support the sweeping proposition which the appellant 
advocates. She also cites Parish, noting that "since the record 
was not before the trial court, there is no basis to sustain the 
determination that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata." Parish. 542 P.2d at 1087. 
Respondent asserts that the substantial portion of the 
transcript from the divorce trial provided to Judge Ballif was 
sufficient for him to make the res judicata ruling. Judge Tibb's 
comment from the transcript was unmistakeable when he said that 
he sought to "resolve all issues between the parties." (D.R. 
209) . 
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In the event this Court should find that the evidence before 
Judge Ballif was insufficient, this Court, as appellant properly 
points out, has independent power to take judicial notice of the 
divorce record (Appeal No. 19,934) which is currently pending 
appeal before this Court. City of Caldwell v. Roark, 98 Idaho 
897, 575 P.2d 495 (1978). A res judicata determination is a 
matter of law and as such, this Court can properly determine 
whether the trial court erred in dismissing the appellantfs 
personal injury claim on the basis of res judicata. 
C. A Judgment Pending on Appeal Should be Allowed Res 
Judicata Effect. 
The judgment which was relied upon by the trial court to bar 
appellant's personal injury action is pending appeal before this 
Court. Under Utah law, as reiterated some thirty-five years ago 
in Young v. Hansen. 118 Utah 1, 218 P.2d 674 (1950), a case on 
appeal cannot bar another action as res judicata because such an 
action is not deemed "final". The respondent contends that the 
law as expressed in Young is outmoded and inapposite to the 
majority and better reasoned rule. The "federal rule" holds that 
the pendency of an appeal does not suspend the operation of an 
otherwise final judgment. See, Deposit Bank v. Frankfurt, 191 
U.S. 499 (1903); Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191 (1932); 18 Wright, 
Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 
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4433 (1981) ; IB J. Moore, J. Lucas and T. Currier, Mooref s 
Federal Practice § 0.416 [3] (2d Ed. 1984). 
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments also establishes that 
a case is deemed final even when it is pending appeal: 
A judgment otherwise final for purposes of 
the law of res judicata is not deprived of 
such finality by the fact that time still 
permits commencement of proceedings in the 
trial court to set aside the judgment and 
grant a new trial or the like. . . . There 
have been differences of opinion about 
whether, or in what circumstances, a judgment 
can be considered final for purposes of res 
judicata when proceedings have been taken to 
reverse or modify it by appeal. The better 
view is that a . judgment otherwise final 
remains so despite the taking of an appeal 
unless, what is called an appeal actually 
consists of a trial de novo. 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 comment f (1982). 
This rule was recently reaffirmed by the United States 
Supreme Court in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie. 452 
U.S. 394 (1981). Seven private anti-trust actions were filed 
against Federated alleging that it had violated the Sherman Act 
by agreeing to fix the retail price of women's clothing sold in 
northern California. The actions were consolidated and later 
dismissed for failure to allege injury to the plaintiffs1 
business or property. Five of the seven plaintiffs appealed, 
but Moitie and one other plaintiff (Brown) choose to refile in 
state court. Federated removed to Federal Court whereupon the 
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actions were dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata, even 
though the other five plaintiffs had appealed the previous 
ruling. 
Based upon an intervening decision of the Supreme Court, the 
five plaintiffs prevailed on appeal. Moitie and Brown then 
appealed the res judicata ruling to the Ninth Circuit. The 
circuit court reversed based upon the closely interwoven nature 
of the two plaintiffs claims to the other five. The Ninth 
Circuit held that the doctrine of res judicata "must, in rare 
instances, give way to overriding concerns of public policy and 
simple justice." 611 F.2d 1267, 1269 Moitie v. Federated 
Department Stores, Inc., F.2d (9th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the res judicata principles of a final 
judgment on the merits are not altered by the fact that the 
judgment may have been wrong or rested on a legal principle 
subsequently overruled on appeal. The Court stated: 
Simple justice is achieved when a complete 
body of law developed over a period of years 
is evenhandedly applied . . . public policy 
dictates that there be an end of litigation; 
that those who have contested an issue shall 
be bound by the result of the contest, and 
that matters once tried shall be forever 
settled as between the parties. . . . [T]he 
doctrine of res judicata being not a mere 
matter of practice or procedure inherited 
from a more technical time than ours, [but 
rather] . . . a rule of fundamental and 
substantial iustice of public policy and of 
private peace. . . . 
452 U.S. at 401. (Citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court thus reinforced the notion that a judgment 
is final even though on appeal. "[N]o principle of law or 
equity . . . sanctions the rejection . . . of the salutary 
principle of res judicata [even on the basis of 'simple justice1 
or public policy]. Id. 
Thus, Moitie stands, not only as a restatement of the 
"federal rule", but as a strong indication by the Supreme 
Court that the doctrine of res judicata is supreme and that 
allowing "public policy" and "simple justice" to override the 
"fundamental and substantial justice" of the principles under-
lying the doctrine of res judicata is erroneous. 
Appellant relies on the case of Young v. Hansen, 218 P.2d 
674 to support her position. Respondent, however, notes that in 
light of more recent cases such as Moitie, the continued vitality 
of Young is suspect. In Young, this Court held that a judgment 
is not final pending appeal. The opinion was based on three Utah 
cases; State Bank of Sevier v. American Cement and Plaster Co., 
80 Utah 250, 10 P.2d 1065 (1932); Schramm-Johnson Drugs v. Kleeb, 
51 Utah 159, 169 P. 161 (1917); Vance v. Heath, 42 Utah 148, 129 
P. 365 (1912); however, continued reliance on these cases is 
impracticable. 
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In Vance and State Bank of Sevier state statutes (Comp. 
Laws Utah 1907, § 2962 and Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 7220) 
specifically provided that a judgment on appeal could have no res 
judicata effect. Those statutes do not exist today, hence 
further reliance upon those two decisions is not warranted. In 
Schramm-Johnson Drugs, this Court held that a judgment of a city 
court can have no res judicata effect when an appeal from city 
court is pending in district court which entitles both parties to 
a trial de novo. Such a rule is still good law and the federal 
rule is in accord. See, Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra., n.8 
at Jurisdiction § 4433; J. Moore, J. Lucas and T. Currier, 
supra., at § 0.416[3]n.22 at p.523-24. However, the de novo 
exception is virtually nonexistent today. As such, it should not 
serve as precedent for the rule that all cases on appeal are not 
final. On the contrary, it should merely be an exception to the 
general rule that a judgment on appeal is deemed final until 
reversed. 
Since the Court in Young relied on three antiquated cases as 
authority for the res judicata rule in Utah, the rule should now 
be struck down in order to reflect the "rule of fundamental and 
substantial justice of public policy and private peace", which 
underlies res judicata. Moitie 452 U.S. at 401 citing Hart Steel 
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Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917). Strong 
policy reasons underlie such a result. As one judge has said: 
[T]hat a judgment is stripped of its res 
judicata consequences because it is being 
appealed would be contrary to the general 
prevailing law. . . . 
* * * 
Such a consequence would also be laughable. 
If a judgment was denied its res judicata 
effect merely because an appeal was pending, 
litigants would be able to refile an iden-
tical case in another trial court while the 
appeal is pending, which would hog-tie the 
trial courts with duplicative litigation. If 
the plaintiff wants to appeal the decision of 
a trial court, the appropriate course is to 
do what the plaintiff here has done — appeal 
the ruling in a state appellate court. It is 
inappropriate for it to be appealing its case 
to another trial court. 
Warwick Corp. v. Maryland Department of Transportation, 573 F. 
Supp. 1011, 1014 (D.Md. 1983). 
While the appellant argues that injustice would result if a 
judgment on appeal were allowed res judicata effect, such 
injustice can be alleviated. In Community Bank v. Vassell, 
280 Ore. 139, 570 P.2d 66 (1977), the Court described one process 
by which this result can be avoided: 
Most courts which have considered the matter 
have held that when a judgment which has been 
given res judicata effect in another case is 
later reversed on appeal, that reversal will 
be taken into account and given effect upon 
an appeal of the case in which the prior 
judgment was relied upon. 
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Id., at 68. 
This Court could follow a similar procedure to avoid 
any injustice if a case, relied upon as res judicata, is later 
reversed on appeal. Thus, in light of the Moitie decision that 
no "public policy" can undermine the doctrine of res judicata, 
as well as the possibility to address any injustice to the 
appellant, this Court should reverse Young and adopt "the 
better view . . . that a judgment otherwise final remains so 
despite the taking of an appeal unless what is called an appeal 
actually consists of a trial de novo." Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 13 comment f, (1982). 
POINT II 
A TRIAL COURTfS DETERMINATION OF AN ISSUE WHICH IS NOT 
ESSENTIAL TO A JUDGMENT ON APPEAL CANNOT, BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, BAR LITIGATION 
OF THE ISSUE IN A SUBSEQUENT ACTION 
If this Court should find that a judgment on appeal can have 
no res judicata effect, then appellant's claim that collateral 
estoppel precludes litigation of the issue of whether the 
shooting was intentional or unintentional must be denied. 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is only allowed 
upon satisfaction of the following four element test set forth 
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by the Utah Supreme Court in Searle Bros, v, Searle, 588 P.2d 
689, 691 (Utah 1978): 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication identical with the one presented 
in the action in question? 
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is 
asserted a party or in privity with a party 
to the prior adjudication? 
4. Was the issue in the first case 
competently, fully and fairly litigated? 
For purposes of this case, primary focus rests on whether 
the second and fourth tests were satisfied in the divorce 
proceeding. When the issue of whether the shooting was inten-
tional was litigated, the trial court in the divorce proceeding 
determined that the shooting was intentional and willful. (D.R. 
140) . However, if this Court rules that the divorce judgment 
is not a "final" judgment for purposes of res judicata, neither 
can it be a final judgment for the purposes of collateral 
estoppel. The test from Searle, supra, requires a final 
judgment, not just a final determination of a particular issue. 
Appellant argues that since respondent only appealed 
the amount of the award in the divorce case all other findings 
must stand. This contention is erroneous. The judgment below 
must be final; and unless and until this Court makes that 
judgment final, no part of it can bar another issue collaterally 
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in a subsequent proceeding. Searle, 588 P.2d at 691; Schaer v. 
State By and Through the Utah Department of Transportation, 657 
P.2d 1337, 1341 (Utah 1983). 
The fourth test mandates that an issue be completely, 
fully and fairly litigated in the prior proceeding. An issue 
which is fully and fairly litigated must be essential to the 
judgment below. See, Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra, § 4421. 
Professor Wright has stated: 
The general rule of issue preclusion is that 
if an issue of fact or law was actually 
litigated and determined by a valid and final 
judgment, the determination is conclusive in 
a subsequent action between the parties, 
whether on the same or a different claim. 
The determination must have been essential to 
the first judgment, however, and if the court 
has determined two issues, either of which 
standing independently would be sufficient to 
support the result, it cannot be said that 
either determination was essential to the 
judgment and thus it will not be conclusive 
with respect to either issue. 
C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 100A 682 (4th Ed. 1983) 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, the prior judgment must not only be final, but it must 
also be essential to any determination made in the trial court. 
The divorce court's findings as to the shooting was not essential 
because it was one of "two findings either of which standing 
independently would be sufficient to support the result. . . • •» 
Finding of fact Number 7, as adopted by the divorce court stated: 
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During the period of time immediately prior 
to the 18th of August, 1980, plaintiff used 
intoxicants in excess and was frequently 
intoxicated and was abusive and embarrassed 
the defendant, all of which constituted 
cruel treatment and caused defendant to 
suffer great mental distress., 
(D.R. 140.) 
The divorce court could have decreed the divorce based upon 
either one of two statutory grounds, i.e. habitual drunkenness or 
mental cruelty. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1 (1953) makes its clear 
that: 
Proceedings in divorce shall be commenced and 
conducted in the manner provided by law for 
proceedings in civil causes, except as 
hereinafter provided, and the court may 
decree dissolution of the marriage contract 
between the plaintiff and the defendant in 
all cases . . . for any of the following 
causes: 
5. Habitual drunkenness of the 
defendant. 
7. Cruel treatment of the plaintiff by 
the defendant to the extent of causing bodily 
injury or great mental distress to the 
plaintiff. 
The divorce court could have decreed the divorce based upon 
two separate statutory grounds without making any unwarranted 
mention of an "intentional, willful and wrongful" shooting. See 
Findings of Fact, numbers 8 and 9. (D.R. 140). 
Thus, the finding which appellant seeks to preclude in 
any further litigation clearly cannot be barred pursuant to 
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collateral estoppel because: (1) the finding was not essential 
to the divorce decree; and (2) this Court may determine that the 
divorce judgment is not a final judgment when it is pending 
appeal. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS NOT ABROGATED 
THE DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY FOR 
UNINTENTIONAL TORTS. 
The trial court granted partial summary judgment holding the 
appellantfs cause of action for negligently caused injury barred 
by interspousal immunity. The trial court reasoned that the Utah 
Supreme Court had not abrogated the doctrine for unintentional 
torts since the intent of the court in Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 
590 (Utah 1980), was to abrogate immunity only for intentional 
tort actions between spouses. 
As the respondent's argument will demonstrate, the ruling by 
the trial court was correct and should be affirmed by this Court 
since Stoker did not broadly abrogate interspousal immunity for 
any type of tort whether intentional or unintentional. The 
decision only went so far as to reaffirm Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 
2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954), a decision that allowed an action 
between spouses for intentional tort. Furthermore, respondent 
contends that interspousal immunity for unintentional torts 
should be upheld by the Court in this case because the doctrine 
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supports significant public policy, i.e., it promotes marital 
harmony, it prevents collusive lawsuits, it avoids numerous 
trivial and spurious lawsuits, it avoids rewarding the tortfeasor 
spouse for wrongdoing, and it does not disturb reliance on the 
present state of the law. 
A. Stoker v. Stoker Did Not Abrogate Interspousal Immunity 
for Unintentional Torts. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d at 590 
did not completely abrogate interspousal immunity for both 
intentional and unintentional torts. The court retained the 
doctrine to bar actions between spouses for unintentional torts. 
That intent is evidenced by the following three reasons. 
The first reason Stoker did not abrogate immunity for 
unintentional torts is that in the decision the court specifi-
cally reaffirmed Tavlor v. Patten. 275 P. 2d at 696, a 1954 
decision that allowed an intentional tort action by a wife 
against her husband which the court had overruled in 1963, 
however, the court did not overrule Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 
Utah 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963), a decision in which the court held 
interspousal immunity barred a negligence action by a wife 
against her husband's estate. It is apparent that if the intent 
of the court was to completely abrogate interspousal immunity, it 
would have reaffirmed Taylor, as it did, and also overrule 
Rubalcava in order to remove the bar to actions between spouses 
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for both intentional and unintentional torts. Failing to do so, 
it is clear the intent of the court in Stoker was to carve out an 
exception to the doctrine only for intentional tort actions. 
This conclusion appears inescapable. 
Second, noticeably absent from the Stoker decision is a 
clear proclamation that interspousal immunity had been completely 
overruled for both intentional and unintentional torts. Any 
statements that could be inferred to grant complete abrogation 
were nullified at the end of the opinion when the court re-
affirmed Taylor, including its original caveat, and conspicuously 
failed to overrule Rubalcava. Significantly, the caveat sought 
to describe certain actions that would not be actionable inten-
tional torts and ended with: ff[T]his does not mean that either 
husband or wife consents to intentionally inflicted serious 
personal injuries by the other." The end of the opinion indi-
cates that the court intended to carve out an exception to 
interspousal immunity only for intentional torts where serious 
injuries had occurred. Stoker was intended to be limited to its 
facts and is restricted to an action between spouses for 
intentionally inflicted injury. 
The third reason Stoker was not intended as the complete 
abrogation of the doctrine is that in references to Stoker in 
subsequent decisions the Supreme Court has indicated that 
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interspousal immunity has been overruled only for intentional 
torts. In a footnote comment to Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864, 
865 n.5 (1981), the Court indicated that the doctrine of inter-
spousal immunity has been recognized in Utah, however, in Stoker 
"this court declined to apply the doctrine in an intentional tort 
case." Similar wording was used by Justice Durham in her 
dissenting opinion in Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1230 
(Utah 1983): "See, Stoker v, Stoker [citation omitted] 
confirming wife's right to an action against her husband for 
intentional infliction of personal injuries." Once again, care 
was taken to describe the right to bring an action only for an 
intentional tort. These two references to Stoker indicate the 
decision carved out an exception to interspousal immunity, thus, 
it did not completely abrogate the doctrine for all tort actions 
between spouses. 
Based on the foregoing three reasons, it is evident that the 
court in Stoker intended to only partially open the door to tort 
lawsuits between spouses. By reaffirming Taylor the immunity to 
intentional tort actions was removed, however, by not overruling 
Ruba1cava, the court left immunity for unintentional tort actions 
in place. The trial court interpreted Stoker in this manner and 
correctly ruled that the appellant's claim based on negligence 
was barred by interspousal immunity. 
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B. Interspousal Immunity Should Not Be Completely 
Abrogated To Allow Unintentional Tort Actions Between 
Spouses. 
It is the respondents contention that interspousal immunity 
should not be completely abrogated to allow unintentional tort 
actions between spouses. This Court should not extend the ruling 
in Stoker to eliminate the immunity for both intentional and 
unintentional torts. Significant public policy is supported by 
the immunity rule which strongly mitigates against completely 
abrogating it. A concise explanation of the policy reasons that 
support upholding the doctrine for only unintentional torts is 
set forth in Moore, The Case for Retention of Interspousal 
Tort Immunity, 7 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. p.943 (1980), wherein the 
author advocates: 
It is the writer's position that interspousal 
immunity should be abolished in all jurisdic-
tions with respect to intentional torts, but 
that it should be retained (or reinstated) 
with regard to torts committed negligently. 
It is obvious that the old common law basis 
for immunity, that husband and wife are one, 
no longer has force, but it is submitted that 
there are valid policy reasons for continuing 
interspousal immunity when the tort has 
occurred through negligence. 
The policy reasons for maintaining immunity are that (1) it 
promotes marital harmony; (2) it prevents collusive lawsuits; (3) 
it avoids numerous trivial and spurious lawsuits; and (4) it 
avoids rewarding the tortfeasor's spouse for wrongdoing by 
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directly or indirectly benefiting from an insurance paid award. 
These important policy considerations, discussed in detail below, 
indicate that the immunity rule for unintentional tort claims is 
well founded and should not be disturbed. 
Barring negligence lawsuits between spouses serves to 
promote and preserve marital harmony by supporting a resolution 
to marital problems by customary channels and cooperation between 
the couple. An option to bring a lawsuit as a means of resolu-
tion would serve to aggravate marital tensions and likely 
irreparably damage a marriage that otherwise could have been 
salvaged. Addressing this concern the Florida Supreme Court in 
Corren v. Corren. 47 So. 774 (Fla. 1950) stated: 
When one ponders the effect upon the marriage 
relationship were each spouse free to sue the 
other for every real or fancied wrong . . . 
one can imagine what the havoc would be to 
the tranquility of the home. Certainly the 
success of the . . . institution of marriage 
must depend in large degree upon harmony 
between the spouses, and the relationship 
could easily be disrupted in the lives of 
offspring blighted if bickerings blossomed 
into lawsuits and conjugal disputes into 
vexatious, if not expensive, litigation. 
The argument that commission of a tort may be an indication 
of an absence of marital felicity fails to consider the 
difference between intentional and unintentional torts. While 
the commission of an intentional tort tends to support this 
position, there is no basis to reason or assume that an act of 
negligence (or omission to act) evidences a lack of marital 
harmony. Clearly, if this Court were to allow negligence actions 
between spouses, marital harmony would be greatly strained and 
the societal interest in successful marriages and families would 
suffer. That consideration was significant to the Court in 
Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 384 P.2d at 391, when the court ruled that 
a wife was barred from bringing a negligence action against her 
husband's estate. 
The answer to the argument for marital 
harmony: that discord will not be engendered 
when the insurance company is to pay, is 
neither sound nor entirely realistic. 
The danger of collusion between spouses for the purpose of 
securing an insurance award is the second policy reason 
mitigating against total abrogation of interspousal immunity. 
Public policy favors the prevention of collusive lawsuits 
through application of the immunity rule, particularly since 
collusive suits are difficult to detect. The Ohio Supreme Court 
in Lyons v. Lyons. 208 N.E. 2d 533 (1965) explained: 
It is argued that the task of weeding out 
fraudulent or collusive suits is properly 
within the sphere of courts and juries. In 
truly adversary cases, fraud is likely 
to be uncovered because of the desire of the 
defendant to avoid the loss. Where insurance 
is involved, the risk of loss is removed, and 
both spouses stand to gain from a decision 
adverse to the defendant. This creates 
a strong inducement to trump up claims and 
conceal possible defenses. 
The third policy promoted by interspousal immunity is the 
prevention of trivial and spurious lawsuits that could arise from 
the various opportunities for conflict and tension between 
spouses in a marriage. The danger of opening the door to such 
actions exists and is not imagined as described in Moore, The 
Case for Retention of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 7 Ohio N.U.L. 
Rev. 943, 949 (1980): 
That the danger of what might be 
characterized as strange and improbable suits 
is real is illustrated by the cases of Mims 
v. Mims [305 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1974)], 
and Brown v. Brown, [409 N.E. 2d 717 (Mass. 
1980)] . 
In the former case a wife sued her husband 
for having fraudulently induced her to marry 
him "with false and fraudulent protestations 
of love" and having thereafter told her that 
he did not love her and then having left 
her (in a home defendant had purchased for 
the parties), assertedly having done all the 
preceding "with wilfulness and malice". The 
Florida District Court of Appeal (4th 
District) affirmed a judgment dismissing the 
action, citing interspousal tort immunity and 
adding: 
The primary one [basis for denying 
this claim] lies in the demands of 
public policy which require, as we 
see it, that domestic quarrels-who 
did what to whom before and during 
a marriage-should not be the 
subject of damage suits and jury 
trials. 
In Brown, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court held that a wife, injured in a fall 
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ascribable to her husband's alleged negli-
gence in failing to shovel the walk after a 
snowstorm, could not sue her spouse in 
tort. 
The final policy reason for upholding interspousal immunity 
for unintentional torts is the avoidance of rewarding a defendant 
spouse for their wrongdoing by benefiting in an award to the 
plaintiff spouse. In an instance where the husband and wife 
cohabit after rendition of a tort award, the tortfeasor spouse 
would share directly or indirectly in any purchases made from the 
award. Public policy disfavors a wrongdoer benefiting from their 
improper actions. Abrogating immunity for unintentional torts 
would lead to such a result. 
Public policy strongly mitigates against removing inter-
spousal immunity from negligent or unintentional tort actions 
between spouses. These four policy considerations weigh heavily 
against expanding the Stoker decision to completely abrogate the 
doctrine of interspousal immunity. It is the respondent's 
contention that immunity should bar unintentional tort actions 
between spouses. 
The appellant's contention that this Court is mandated to 
interpret Utah's Married Women's Act, Section 30-2-4 Utah Code 
Annotated, to allow lawsuits by a wife against her husband for 
both intentional and unintentional torts fails to take into 
consideration the significant policy reasons herein discussed. 
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Policy has been the basis for decisions in other jurisdictions 
that have held the immunity rule abrogated for intentional torts 
but not for unintentional torts notwithstanding the court's 
interpretation of its Married Women's Act. 
The Kansas Supreme Court in Stevens v. Stevens, 647 P.2d 
1346, 1348 (Kan. 1982), held interspousal immunity abrogated for 
intentional torts but kept the doctrine as a bar to unintentional 
torts because of public policy reasons. The court stated: 
In light of our Kansas Constitution . . . and 
the Kansas Married Women's Act . . . there is 
no constitutional or statutory interspousal 
immunity . . . . Accordingly, an exception 
to the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity 
is now created and declared by this court as 
regards wilful and intentional torts. . . 
We are well aware of the various arguments 
put forth that the entire doctrine of 
interspousal immunity should be abrogated. 
Mr. Justice Prager in his dissenting opinion 
in Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. beginning at p. 
97, .631 P.2d 646, thoroughly covers and 
advocates these arguments. It would serve no 
purpose to go back over the counter arguments 
set forth in the majority opinion in Guffy. 
i Suffice it to say a majority of this court 
believe it is now the best interest of the 
people of this state to retain the doctrine 
of interspousal immunity for injuries and 
death resulting from negligent or even 
reckless acts and to carve out an exception 
as regards wilful and intentional torts. 
The importance of promoting and preserving marital harmony 
by closing the door to negligent tort actions between spouses led 
the court in Stevens to only partially abrogate the immunity rule 
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notwithstanding its Married Womenfs Act. The decision serves as 
precedent for this Court to follow. 
In a related manner, the Idaho Supreme Court in Lorana v. 
Hays, 209 P.2d 733 (Idaho 1949) interpreted its Constitution and 
Married Women's Act to not bar a wife from bringing an inten-
tional tort action against her husband. Years later when the 
court decided Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 539 P.2d 566 (Idaho 
1975), it expanded Lorana by abrogating the doctrine for negli-
gent tort actions between spouses resulting from motor vehicle 
accidents. A significant portion of the immunity rule was kept 
intact for all unintentional torts not resulting from motor 
vehicle accidents notwithstanding the clear statement of the 
court in Lorana that its statutes [Married Women's Act] removed 
the common law immunity to actions between spouses. Policy 
considerations restrained the court from completely abrogating 
interspousal immunity in Idaho. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court carefully weighed policy 
considerations when it decided Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E. 2d 526 
(Mass. 1976) and determined immunity between spouses was 
abrogated only for negligence actions arising from motor vehicle 
accidents. Declining to completely abrogate the immunity rule 
for all torts, whether intentional or unintentional, the court 
stated: 
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We conclude therefore that it is open to this 
court to reconsider the common law rule of 
interspousal immunity and, having done so, we 
are of the opinion that it should no longer 
bar an action by one spouse against another 
in a case such as the present one. . . . In 
arriving at this conclusion we are mindful 
that the rights and privileges of husbands 
and wives with respect to one another are not 
unaffected by the marriage they have volun-
tarily undertaken together. Conduct, 
tortious between two strangers, may not be 
tortious between spouses because of the 
mutual concessions implied in the marital 
relationship. For this reason we limit our 
holding today to claims arising out of motor 
vehicle accidents. 
For additional decisions holding the immunity rule abrogated 
for only negligence actions arising from motor* vehicle accidents 
and intentional torts, see: Diabv v. Diqbv, 388 A.2d 1 (RI 
1978); Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974); Surratt v. 
Thompson, 183 S.E. 2d 200 (Vir. 1971). 
At the heart of these decisions is a determination by the 
court as to how the institution of marriage would be effected by 
allowing spouses to bring lawsuits against one another. The 
majority of courts agree that once an intentional tort has been 
committed, the peace and harmony in the marriage has likely been 
so damaged that there is little danger that it will be further 
impaired by a lawsuit. However, the same conclusion cannot be 
reached by the commission of an act or omission to act which 
results in negligent inflection of injuries. The wilfullness 
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or malice to cause harm is absent, hence marital harmony has not 
likely been irretrievably lost. Society's interest in 
maintaining the institution of marriage along with the policy 
considerations of preventing collusive and trivial lawsuits has 
caused the courts to limit abrogation of the immunity rule to 
only intentional torts and negligent torts arising from motor 
vehicle accidents. A number of decisions, herein explained, have 
supported this view notwithstanding existence of Married Women's 
Acts similar to Utah's. 
Respondent contends that this Court should not extend Stoker 
to completely abrogate interspousal immunity in Utah. Societal 
interests are best served with the doctrine in place to bar 
unintentional tort actions between spouses. This Court should 
rule that the trial court correctly interpreted Stoker to 
abrogate interspousal immunity for only intentional torts and 
that the doctrine should be left in place to bar unintentional 
tort actions. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the respondent's contention that this Court should 
affirm the ruling of the trial court that held the appellant's 
action for personal injuries barred by application of the 
doctrine of res judicata. In the prior divorce action, the trial 
court fully adjudicated the personal injury issues and granted 
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the appellant an award for that claim that was combined into the 
alimony and property settlement determination. To allow the 
appellant to proceed with this personal injury action would 
provide her with a double recovery for the personal injury 
claim. Res judicata is not defeated for the reasons alleged by 
the appellant since sufficient portions of the divorce action 
record were before the court in this matter and the finality of 
a judgment is not disturbed because of an appeal. 
In the event of reward, the trial court should be restructed 
that collateral estoppel does not preclude re-litigation of 
whether the shooting was intentional or unintentional. 
Collateral estoppel requires a final judgment and it requires 
that the issue be essential to the ruling of the prior action. 
The divorce action could have been determined and rested upon 
either one of two independent statutory grounds, hence the 
shooting issue was not essential to the divorce judgment. 
Lastly, the respondent contends that this Court should 
affirm the trial court1s ruling that the appellant's uninten-
tional tort claim was barred by the doctrine of interspousal 
immunity. While an exception to the doctrine has been carved 
out for intentional tort actions, the immunity has been left in 
place as a complete bar to unintentional tort actions. The 
doctrine should not be further abrogated to allow both 
42 
intentional and unintentional tort actions between spouses 
because significant public policy is served by the immunity. 
Numerous other jurisdictions have relied upon these policy 
considerations to partially abrogate interspousal immunity only 
for intentional torts, while leaving it as a bar to unintentional 
torts. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 31st day of March, 1986. 
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